Managing uncertainty: a review of food system scenario analysis and modelling by Reilly, Michael & Willenbockel, Dirk
Review
Managing uncertainty: a review of food
system scenario analysis and modelling
Michael Reilly1,* and Dirk Willenbockel2
1Foresight Research and Knowledge Management, Government Ofﬁce for Science,
1 Victoria Street, London SW1H 0ET, UK
2Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
Complex socio-ecological systems like the food system are unpredictable, especially to long-term hor-
izons such as 2050. In order to manage this uncertainty, scenario analysis has been used in conjunction
with food system models to explore plausible future outcomes. Food system scenarios use a diversity of
scenario types and modelling approaches determined by the purpose of the exercise and by technical,
methodological and epistemological constraints. Our case studies do not suggest Malthusian futures
for a projected global population of 9 billion in 2050; but international trade will be a crucial determi-
nant of outcomes; and the concept of sustainability across the dimensions of the food system has been
inadequately explored so far. The impact of scenario analysis at a global scale could be strengthened
with participatory processes involving key actors at other geographical scales. Food system models are
valuable in managing existing knowledge on system behaviour and ensuring the credibility of qualitat-
ive stories but they are limited by current datasets for global crop production and trade, land use and
hydrology. Climate change is likely to challenge the adaptive capacity of agricultural production and
there are important knowledge gaps for modelling research to address.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ﬁrst documented attempt to use modelling to
explore the uncertainty surrounding the world’s ability
to feed a growing population was possibly by Malthus
(1798) in the ﬁrst edition of An Essay on the Principles
of Population. This essay famously put forth the
hypothesis that exponential population growth and
its associated demand for food would overwhelm
linear growth of supply. Malthus’s hypothesis has
been subject to persistent challenge both empirically
and theoretically (Boserup 1965); but with population
growth projected by the UN to increase to 9.1 billion
in 2050, concerns remain.
More recently, according to McCalla & Revoredo
(2001), there have been at least 30 different major
long-term model-based simulations of global food
supply and demand undertaken over the second half
of the twentieth century. In the past decade, a number
of further studies concerned with the future of the
global food system have been published. In order to
manage the uncertainties inherent in this system, these
studies have used scenario analysis as well as model
simulations. This article reviews a selection of con-
temporary studies which use scenario analysis and
modelling to explore the future of the global food
system to 2050. The case studies under review are
World Agriculture towards 2030/2050, the
Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in
Agriculture (CAWMA), a study on the effects of climate
change on global food production based on Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change socio-economic
scenarios, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
(MA) scenarios and the Agrimonde 1 scenario. Case
studies have been chosen to illustrate a scenario typology
and to demonstrate a diversity of modelling approaches.
We begin with a short history of scenario analysis and
then provide an explanation of why scenarios have been
increasingly used to manage uncertainty in systems with
socio-economic and biophysical dimensions. A typology
is proposed to classify the scenarios used by the case
studies. An outline of the quantitative modelling
approaches of the case studies is followed by brief sum-
maries of their scenarios and a discussion of results.
The article concludes by considering some of the chal-
lenges for food system scenario analysis and modelling.
2. SCENARIO ANALYSIS
(a) Origins of scenario analysis
The Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes a scenario as ‘a
postulated sequence or development of events’. Prominent
proponents of scenario analysis view scenarios
variously as ‘hypothetical sequences of events
constructed for the purpose of focusing attention
on causal processes and decision-points’
(Kahn & Wiener 1967,p .6 ) , ‘focused descriptions of
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script-like or narrative fashion’ (Schoemaker 1993,
p. 195), ‘internally consistent and challenging narrative
descriptions of possible futures’ (van der Heijden 2005,
p. 14), as ‘a tool for ordering one’s perceptions about
alternative future environments in which one’s decisions
might be played out’ (Schwartz 1991,p .4 ) o r‘ a
description of potential future conditions, developed
to inform decision-making under uncertainty’ (Parson
et al.2 0 0 7 ,p .1 ) .
The emphasis on exploring multiple futures under-
lines that scenario analysis does not aim to predict the
future. Scenario analysis copes with uncertainty by pre-
senting a range of plausible futures, usually without
assigning probabilities to the outcomes. In particular,
for complex socio-ecological systems, scenarios can be
used to explore uncertainties over long-term horizons
that cannot be represented by probability distributions
on known parameters (Swart et al.2 0 0 4 ; Parson 2008).
The origins of scenario analysis lead back to the
Manhattan Project in 1942, where the limits of using
probability in decision-making led to computer simu-
lations of atomic explosions. The concept was
further reﬁned after World War II at the RAND Cor-
poration, particularly by Hermann Kahn, and
especially for the large-scale early warning system Air
Defence System Missile Command. Kahn’s book On
Thermonuclear War used scenario analysis to explore
the uncertainties surrounding nuclear war (Kahn
1960). In 1961, Kahn left RAND to set up the
Hudson Institute, a think-tank with a broader remit
for scenario analysis. A subsequent book The Year
2000 written in 1967 graduated his methods beyond
military planning; and it was also a signal of growing
curiosity in the comparative advantage scenario
analysis might offer to business.
Pierre Wack pioneered the use of scenario analysis
at Shell based on possibilities presented by Kahn for
corporate planning. In the late 1960s, Shell used a
system of Uniﬁed Planning Machinery with a 6 year
horizon to prepare its value chain for the future. It
was posited however, on a single ‘business as usual’
scenario. Wack participated in an experiment to look
ahead 15 years in an exercise called Horizon Year
Planning. The striking ﬁndings of the study, which
suggested that transformative change could be immi-
nent in the oil market, provoked Shell in 1971 to
migrate from predictive forecasting to a new method
of scenario analysis (Wack 1985a).
The approach employed by Wack at Shell, and
adapted from Kahn’s early work, identiﬁes predeter-
mined elements in a system of interest in order that
the outcomes of uncertainties, which are prioritized
strategically, can be explored in multiple scenarios.
(b) How scenario analysis can be used to manage
uncertainty
The food system shares an important attribute with
that of the energy system: crop-based technologies
often have long lead times. Strategic planning is
likely to become increasingly necessary if the world is
to feed a projected 9 billion people healthily and
sustainably in 2050.
The food system is multi-dimensional (Ericksen
2008) and includes social, economic, biophysical, pol-
itical and institutional dimensions. Using a model as a
proxy to this system raises ontological and epistemo-
logical issues (Rotmans & van Asselt 2001).
Funtowicz & Ravetz (1990) suggest three types of
uncertainties in integrated assessment:
— technical uncertainties;
— methodological uncertainties;
— epistemological uncertainties.
There are technical uncertainties concerning the qual-
ity of data available to calibrate the model and to
determine input assumptions for drivers of change.
There are methodological uncertainties because we
may lack sufﬁcient knowledge to create an adequate
model form with suitable structure and functional
forms of behavioural equations. Epistemological
uncertainties refer to the completeness of the model:
changes in human behaviour and values, randomness
of nature, technological surprises and so-called high
impact, high uncertainty ‘black swan’ events may all
be unknowable (Taleb 2007). Furthermore, a complex
system may be fundamentally indeterminate. An
accumulation of these uncertainties in a model simu-
lation makes assigning probabilities to outcomes
challenging.
These challenges notwithstanding, scenario analysis
offers an opportunity to manage technical uncertainty
in the socio-economic dimensions of the food system
differently from uncertainties in its biophysical dimen-
sion (Rotmans & van Asselt 2001; Do ¨o ¨s 2002). Model
simulations using scenarios of multiple input assump-
tions for socio-economic variables may mitigate
technical uncertainties in the model. However, it will
not be robust to manage uncertainty through multiple
input assumptions for socio-economic variables if
uncertainties in its biophysical dimensions are not
respected. For example, current models used to simu-
late the effects of climate change on sea-level rise may
not be adequate proxies to the system because of epis-
temological uncertainties surrounding the dynamics of
melting ice sheets (Hansen 2007). In addition, it will
not be accurate to quantify socio-economic drivers of
change as discrete or exogenous if they are actually
endogenous to the system or correlated with other
drivers (Garb et al. 2008).
(c) Typology of scenarios
If scenarios are to be used to manage the uncertainties
that can accumulate in models, the type of scenario
chosen will depend on the purpose of the exercise. A
typology modiﬁed from Bo ¨rjeson et al. (2005) is
proposed to classify three different approaches to
scenarios of the future:
— projections;
— exploratory scenarios;
— normative scenarios.
Baseline projections can be used to estimate the future
state of a system subject to ‘business as usual’ assump-
tions with no major policy changes. Projections can
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reacts if a certain set of ‘what-if’ assumptions are
made. Such scenarios, which quantify outcomes, are
challenged by uncertainty in the long term, and may
not explore adequately variations in socio-economic
drivers, or transformation in the system (Alcamo
2001). On the other hand, the process to create projec-
tions is likely to be less time-consuming than for other
scenario types; and they may have utility to food
system actors.
The narratives of exploratory scenarios are predom-
inantly qualitative but usually with a quantitative
underpinning provided by model simulation outputs.
They can either focus on drivers of change that are
exogenous to the system and out-with the control of
the actors for whom the scenarios are being developed,
external scenarios, or they can include policy, in which
case they are described as strategic. Exploratory scen-
arios are useful if the uncertainties in the system
cannot be sufﬁciently managed using a model, or
modelling framework alone. For example, a techno-
logical surprise like the ‘green revolution’ would have
been very difﬁcult to simulate using prior historical
data but nonetheless had a profound impact on the
food system and its outcomes (Evans 1998). Meth-
odological and epistemological uncertainty may be
explored using qualitative narratives.
Normative scenarios develop stories that meet
speciﬁc outcomes or targets. Preserving scenarios
seek out pathways for the system to reach an outcome
without transformation. Alternatively, transforming
scenarios assume that change in the system will be
necessary to meet the normative target. Although nor-
mative scenarios meet a speciﬁc outcome or target,
they are, paradoxically, the least predictive of scenario
types. Indeed, such scenarios may be helpful in redu-
cing dilemmas of legitimacy in futures analysis
(Robinson 1992).
3. FOOD SYSTEM MODELLING IN SCENARIO
CASE STUDIES
The scenario studies included in this review use
models of the food system to simulate endogenous
variables including food production and consumption.
Table 1 provides a brief synopsis of the various models
employed, distinguishing the key variables determined
endogenously by each model from drivers of change
that are exogenous to the model and based on external
assumptions. The geographical and sectoral resolution
of the models is also provided.
The studies of the MA and Parry et al. (2004) adopt
general equilibrium representations of global prod-
uction, consumption and trade, in which sectoral
and economy-wide variables including aggregate
income, factor prices and real exchange rates are sim-
ultaneously determined in an internally consistent
manner. In contrast, the World Agriculture Towards
2030/2050 and CAWMA scenarios are based on a par-
tial equilibrium approach, which treats global markets
for individual agricultural commodities one by one in
isolation from each other. In these models, regional
demand and regional supply for each agricultural com-
modity is a function of its market price for given levels
of income and given productivity drivers, and the
model solves endogenously for the world market
price that equates global supply and demand. The
partial-analytic approach ignores economy-wide
constraints including budget constraints on the
demand side, balance-of-payments constraints and
aggregate land endowment constraints, as well as
repercussions of shocks to agricultural markets on
aggregate income. This simpliﬁes the analysis con-
siderably, but limits the domain of applicability of
these partial-analytic models to scenarios in which
major shocks that affect many agricultural commod-
ities simultaneously do not occur. On the other
hand, partial equilibrium multi-market models like
the World Food Model, IMPACT and WATERSIM
support a more detailed commodity disaggregation
than global computable general equilibrium (CGE)
models.
Among the ﬁve scenario exercises considered here,
the MA scenario study employs the most complex
and sophisticated modelling framework. Its centre-
piece is the global integrated assessment model
IMAGE, developed at the Dutch National Institute
for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM).
IMAGE is designed to capture interactions between
economic activity, land use, greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, climate, crop yields and other environ-
mental variables. It includes a multi-region CGE
model of global trade and production, a carbon-cycle
module to calculate GHG emissions resulting from
economic activity including energy and land use, a
detailed land-use module and an atmosphere–ocean
climate module that translates GHG emissions into
climate outcomes. The model-determined tempera-
ture and precipitation outcomes in turn feed back
into the performance of the economic system via
agricultural productivity impacts.
For the purposes of the MA study IMAGE has been
‘soft-linked’ to a range of other simulation models
(listed in table 1) to achieve a further downscaling of
variables of interest. In soft-linked model ensembles,
output variables from one model are used to inform
the selection of values for the input variables or par-
ameters of another model, but the different models
are not formally merged—or hard-wired—into a
single consistent simultaneous-equation system.
Downscaling refers to the process of disaggregating
variables towards a more detailed spatial or commod-
ity classiﬁcation scale. For instance, changes in crop
yields owing to climate change predicted by IMAGE
have been used to adjust the agricultural productivity
parameters of the agricultural market model
IMPACT, which features a ﬁner disaggregation of
crops by type and region than IMAGE. Similarly, the
soft link with the integrated assessment model AIM
provides downscaled results for the Asia-Paciﬁc
region. Changes in irrigation within IMPACT as well
as the climate projections of IMAGE have been used
as inputs for the WaterGAP hydrology and water-use
model simulations to assess water stress.
Owing to the heterogeneity of scales, accounting
methods and conceptual frameworks across different
models, the soft-linking approach is associated with
substantial problems in achieving consistency and is
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for linking models across disciplines and scales is still
weak and requires speciﬁc attention in future research
(Ewert et al. 2009). On the other hand, links can be
based on established models and can exploit the
embodied specialized knowledge from different discip-
lines rather than requiring new modelling work. As
Bo ¨hringer & Lo ¨schel (2006) put it, these pragmatic
advantages may outweigh to some degree impending
deﬁciencies in overall consistency.
The Agribiom tool employed in the Agrimonde
study endeavours to simulate regional supplies, uses
and balances of physical food biomasses and their cal-
orie equivalents without any attempt to determine
market prices for agricultural commodities. Thus,
the simulated outcomes may be achievable in a bio-
physical sense but are not necessarily viable in an
economic sense.
As pointed out in §2b, the simulation results from
any dynamic global simulation analysis for a long-
term horizon of several decades are surrounded by
numerous uncertainties—about the adequacy of the
model structure to capture the key factors at work,
about the presence of nonlinearities that entail tipping
points beyond which fundamental change in systems
behaviour occurs, about model parameters, and
about the evolution of the main drivers of change in
agricultural systems. Model outputs should not be
misinterpreted as forecasts with well-deﬁned conﬁ-
dence intervals. Rather they are meant to provide
quantiﬁed insights about the complex interactions in
a highly interdependent system and the potential gen-
eral size order of effects, which cannot be obtained by
qualitative and theoretical reasoning alone. The results
are crucially contingent on the current state of scienti-
ﬁc knowledge used in the course of the development
and parameterization of the model components. For
example, the skill of the climate model component in
IMAGE is necessarily restricted by the current state
of the art in global circulation modelling and hence
precipitation is poorly represented, which in turn
limits the accurate simulation of crop responses.
4. CASE STUDIES OF FOOD SYSTEM
SCENARIOS
This review will adopt a conceptualization of the food
system and its outcomes suggested by Ericksen (2008)
where food system activities are linked to social wel-
fare, food security and natural capital outcomes.
Case studies have been chosen to illustrate our
typology (ﬁgure 1).
(a) Projections
(i) World agriculture towards 2030/2050
The UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
produced a baseline projection of the food system to
2050 using its partial equilibrium, World Food
Model (Alexandratos 2006). One of the main pur-
poses of this scenario was to consider whether a
revision by the UN in 2004 of its population growth
projections could result in a Malthusian future.
In this future, growth in cereal productivity declines
from 2.1 per cent per annum in 1961–2001 to 1.2 per
cent per annum in 2001–2030 and then to 0.6 per
cent in 2030–2050. However, this decline occurs
world agriculture towards 2030/2050 FAO
rainfed high-yield
rainfed low-yield
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Global Orchestration
TechnoGarden
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Figure 1. Classiﬁcation of review studies based on scenario typology. Source: modiﬁed from Borjeson et al. (2005).
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capita consumption levels improve in developing
countries to reach an average of 3070 kcal per capita
by 2050. A peak in the population by the middle of
the century is expected to ease the demands on natural
capital from agricultural production. Reductions in
absolute numbers of those malnourished are tempered
by population growth but the proportion falls from
20.3 per cent in 1990/1992 to 3.9 per cent by 2050.
Nevertheless, countries that increase their per capita
consumption levels could still face a ‘double burden
of malnutrition’ on healthcare systems if diets contain
a higher proportion of fat, sugar and salt. Increasing
demand in developing countries heightens import
dependencies: but the market is projected to adapt
autonomously, and developing world net exporters
increasingly trade with developing world net impor-
ters. Growing competition among developing world
producers to supply a relatively static market of devel-
oped world consumers leads to some price instability.
The scenario was produced before the food price
spike of 2007, which has been attributed partly to a
rise in ﬁrst-generation biofuel production (World
Bank 2008). Although the implications for the food
system of future energy prices are not fully explored
in this baseline projection, there is foresight in its call
for more analysis on the prospects of competition for
land between food and fuel. Finally, there remain sev-
eral countries, identiﬁed as vulnerable to food
insecurity in this future, challenged by a deleterious
conﬂuence of high population growth rates, limited
prospects for enabling economic growth, and low
capacity for agricultural production.
(ii) Comprehensive assessment of water management
in agriculture
The CAWMA created ﬁve ‘what-if?’ projections to test
the efﬁcacy of alternative investment approaches to
meet the projected food demand in 2050 (de Fraiture
et al. 2007)( ﬁgure 2). The scenario narratives rely on
outputs from WATERSIM, a quantitative model con-
sisting of two integrated modules: a partial equilibrium
framework based on the IMPACT model simulating
food supply and demand, and a water balance and
accounting framework simulating the supply and
demand of water.
To meet the projected food demand, it has been
estimated that water use for crops, or evapotranspira-
tion, will have to increase by around 70–90%
(de Fraiture et al. 2007). However, agriculture is
likely to face competition from other sectors for fresh-
water; its use is more consumptive; withdrawals may
not be accessible or sustainable; and pollution is
increasing (Shiklomanov 2000). Although equipped
irrigated areas have more than doubled since 1960,
more than half of agricultural production still comes
from rainfed agriculture, which is inherently uncertain.
In the ‘rainfed optimistic’ scenario increasing con-
cerns about the high cost and environmental impacts
of large-scale irrigation provoke a step-change,
whereby there is no expansion in the irrigation area
for crop production. Instead there is a focus on rural,
poor smallholders in rainfed areas. Institutional
reform encourages farm-level adoption of rec-
ommended production practices including in situ
water management and harvesting techniques.
Around 80 per cent of exploitable yield gaps are
assumed to be bridged by 2050. The projections of
this scenario suggest that there is at least the potential
of rainfed agriculture to meet additional food
requirements globally.
The risks in a predominantly rainfed strategy are
demonstrated in the ‘rainfed pessimistic’ scenario. In
this scenario, only 20 per cent of exploitable yield
gaps are bridged by 2050, mostly as a consequence
of slow rates of adoption of recommended production
practices. The rainfed area must increase by 53 per
cent to meet future food demands; such expansion is
feasible but there may be negative environmental con-
sequences. Countries without potential to expand
rainfed areas must increase food imports; and the
volume of global food trade necessarily increases.
Lower levels of food availability and accessibility in
poorer countries exacerbate food insecurity, which is
adjudged to be highest in this particular scenario.
Alternatively, in the ‘irrigation expansion’ scenario
there is an emphasis on food self-sufﬁciency and
improved access to agricultural water for more
people, particularly in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
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less than 25 per cent of additional global food demand.
Furthermore, the costs of such expansion are substan-
tial—estimated at around US$400 billion to expand
the harvested area; with additional costs to build sup-
porting infrastructure and create institutional capacity
to manage irrigation schemes. Although food security
improves and rural incomes are enhanced, pressure
on freshwater resources increases. The number of
people experiencing physical water scarcity increases
from 1.2 billion to 2.6 billion in 2050. There is
increased competition among sectors and trans-
boundary conﬂicts intensify. In several basins,
minimum environmental ﬂow requirements are not
satisﬁed, implying adverse environmental impacts of
withdrawals on ecosystems and ﬁsheries.
Many irrigation schemes, particularly in South Asia,
perform below their potential and there are opportu-
nities for improving water productivity. The ‘irrigation
yield improvement’ scenario assumes that 75–80% of
exploitable yield gaps are bridged in coming decades
from a combination of institutional reform, better
motivation of farmers and water managers to improve
productivityof land and water, and improved water allo-
cation mechanisms among competing actors. Improving
irrigated yields contributes around 50 per cent of
increased global food demand by 2050; there is also a
9 per cent expansion of irrigated area globally. Irrigated
diversions increase by 32 per cent but a larger amount of
diverted water is used beneﬁcially by crops, livestock or
other productive processes. Investment costs are again
substantial and are estimated at around US$300 billion.
The efﬁcacies of these alternative strategies are
dependent on regional agro-ecological capability and
capacity (Fisher et al. 2002), and outcomes for regions
vary considerably. In the ‘trade’ scenario countries
with capability and capacity export to countries that
do not. The logic in this scenario recognizes an
increasing awareness of the concept of virtual water
trade (Allan 1998; Hoekstra & Chapagain 2008)a s
well as the relatively modest volumes of trade in devel-
oping countries. Cereal trade, for example, relieves
pressure on irrigation water because major grain
exporters in the USA, Canada, Argentina and
France produce grain in highly productive rainfed con-
ditions. Thus, trade has the potential to mitigate water
scarcity and reduce environmental degradation.
Increases in food demand can be satisﬁed through
international trade without worsening water scarcity
or requiring additional costly irrigation infrastructure.
However, trade alone will not solve structural prob-
lems of water scarcity; and poor water-scarce
countries may not be able to afford to import large
amounts of agricultural commodities without foreign
currency from exports. Countries struggling with
food insecurity may be wary of depending on imports
to satisfy basic food needs, especially after the recent
food price spike. The inherently political nature of
the food system also suggests that it is simplistic to
assume that freer international trade is readily achiev-
able even if it is considered by many to be beneﬁcial to
food system outcomes. Trade, furthermore, requires
energy and recent spikes in oil prices have resulted in
de-globalization hypotheses (Rubin 2009).
(b) Exploratory scenarios
Parry et al. (2004) explored the impact of climate
change on food security outcomes to 2080. Socio-
economic scenarios (A1FI, A2, B1, B2), previously
produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change were reused (Arnell et al. 2004). A modelling
framework, based on a general equilibrium approach,
was created to estimate the response of cereal yields
to simulated climate change based on these scenarios,
and then to quantify the implications for cereal pro-
duction, prices and risk of hunger (ﬁgure 3).
Uncertainty in the socio-economic dimension of the
food system (e.g. population and GDP growth) is
managed with scenarios, whereas uncertainty in the
biophysical dimensions (cereal productivity growth)
is managed using modelling. Although this study
resembles ‘what-if’ projections, it augments a set of
external exploratory scenarios.
The A1FI scenario is a globalized future with very
rapid economic growth and greater distribution of
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Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)income between regions. Population growth is low and,
similarly to the FAO baseline projection, peaks by mid-
century. The energy system in this future is fossil fuel-
intensive, global temperatures are the highest and
cereal yields suffer most, especially in Africa and parts
of Asia. Assuming no CO2 fertilization effects, aggre-
gate cereal yields worldwide are depressed by roughly
10 per cent in 2050 compared with a reference scenario,
there are large price increases, and an additional 100
million people may be at risk of hunger. With CO2 fer-
tilization effects, many areas witness yield increases,
apart from Africa, which is unable to counter a 20 per
cent reduction. The effect of carbon fertilization limits
rises in prices to around 10 per cent and the additional
risk of hunger is hugely reduced.
A2 is a heterogeneous world where there is more self-
reliance and preservation of local identities. Population is
higher and economic growth less rapid than in A1FI.
Although there is an increasing divergence in cereal
yields between developed and developing countries in
all the scenarios, the differences are greatest in this scen-
ario. In particular, yields dramatically decrease in
developing countries with regional temperature increases
and precipitation decreases. Although the impact on pro-
duction upto 2050 is similar to A1FI, prices are higher,
and with a larger and poorer population the additional
number of people at risk of hunger is greater. Without
CO2 fertilization effects, around 200 million people are
additionally at risk of hunger by 2050 and there are
almost 6000 million by 2080.
B1 is a globalized future with the same low popu-
lation as A1FI, but economic development follows a
more environmentally sustainable pathway. Global
temperatures in B1 are the coolest of the IPCC scen-
arios and cereal production decreases without CO2
fertilization effects are around half that of A1F1 and
A2. The CO2 fertilization effect is less signiﬁcant in
this future because of the lower levels of CO2 concen-
trations in the atmosphere. Including the CO2
fertilization effect limits production decreases; but
these reductions are smaller than in the A1FI and
A2 scenarios because B1 has less CO2 in its atmos-
phere. Price increases are the lowest in the scenarios
with or without CO2 fertilization effects at just over
10 per cent and just under 50 per cent, respectively.
Without CO2 fertilization effects, the additional
people at risk of hunger in 2050 and 2080 are con-
siderably less than in A1FI and A2 futures, which
are dominated by economic growth.
In contrast to B1, in the B2 world there is an empha-
sis on local rather than global solutions to economic,
social and environmental sustainability. Population
increases but at a rate lower than A2. Economic
growth in this more regionalized world is also moderate.
Food security outcomes such as production, prices and
additional people at risk of hunger are a little worse than
in B1 but better than in A1FI and A2.
Parry et al. (2004) ﬁnd that, based on IPCC scen-
arios, it will be possible to feed a growing world
population in 2050. While climate change appears
likely to widen the difference in cereal yields between
developed and developing countries, global trade pre-
vents negative food security outcomes. However,
regional outcomes will vary, particularly in Africa,
Latin America and parts of Asia, and the number of
additional people at risk of hunger may increase,
especially to 2080. CO2 fertilization effects are likely
to be an important determinant of future food security
outcomes in 2050; but if such effects are based on
experimental results in either controlled environmental
conditions or optimal conditions, the beneﬁts for low-
input, stressed environments may be over-estimated
(Long et al. 2006). Results also suggest that the
major climate stressors for agricultural production
could lie from 2050 to 2080 (ﬁgure 3).
(i) Millennium ecosystem assessment
The main objectives of the scenario study conducted
as part of the 2005 MA are ‘to assess future changes
in world ecosystems and resulting ecosystem services
over the next 50 years and beyond, to assess the con-
sequences of these changes for human well-being,
and to inform decisions-makers at various scales
about these potential developments and possible
response strategies and policies to adapt to or mitigate
these changes’ (Carpenter et al. 2005, p. 450). The
four MA scenarios are framed in terms of contrasting
evolutions of governance structures for international
cooperation and trade (globalized versus regionalized)
and cooperation and contrasting approaches towards
ecosystem management (pro-active versus reactive).
The approach to scenario development uses an itera-
tive process of qualitative storyline development and
quantitative modelling in order to capture aspects of
ecosystem services that are quantiﬁable as well as
those that are difﬁcult or impossible to express in
quantitative terms. The scenarios can be classiﬁed
using our typology as exploratory and strategic. In
conception, the results of the quantitative simulation
models are meant to ensure the consistency of the
storylines (ﬁgure 4). However, in practice, time con-
straints limited the number of iterations and the MA
scenario report candidly admits the presence of
remaining inconsistencies between storyline narratives
and simulation results.
In all four scenarios global per capita food pro-
duction in 2050 is higher than in the 2000 base.
Thus, none of the futures presented is a classic
Malthusian scenario (Willenbockel 2009). However,
the global average masks considerable variation
across regions within the individual scenarios.
Under the Global Orchestration (GO) scenario,
which is characterized by global trade liberalization,
global cooperation and a reactive approach towards
environmental management, by 2050 agricultural
output in both developed and developing regions is
mostly produced on large highly mechanized farms.
Low-intensity farming continues only as a lifestyle
choice and on marginal lands in least developed areas.
Despite this intensiﬁcation, crop area expands globally
as the share of meat in people’s diets increases with
growing prosperity, which in turn raises the demand
for animal feed. Around 50 per cent of sub-Saharan
Africa’s forests are envisaged to disappear towards
2050. Growth in per capita calorie availability is highest
among the four scenarios, and child malnourishment
drops to around 40 per cent of current levels.
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technology- and market-based approach to ecosystems
fosters a rapid transformation of agriculture across the
globe. In developed regions, the assignment of prop-
erty rights generates incentives for farmers to
dedicate land increasingly to the provision of multiple
ecosystem services. The elimination of agricultural
trade barriers attracts investments from agri-business
and supermarket chains into Latin American, African
and Eastern European agriculture and leads to agri-
cultural intensiﬁcation in combination with an
increasing development and adoption of locally
adapted genetically modiﬁed crops in these regions.
Indeed, sub-Saharan Africa is envisaged to turn into
‘one of the globe’s ‘breadbaskets’ with some of the
cleanest cities and most rational land use in the
world’ (Carpenter et al. 2005, p. 259). Calorie con-
sumption levels and child malnourishment are
similar to the GO scenario.
The Adapting Mosaic (AM) scenario is a future
with an emphasis on local approaches and local
learning to the improvement of ecosystem services
and with diverse outcomes across regions. Under
AM, the WTO Doha Round trade liberalization
negotiations break down and climate change
mitigation as a globally coordinated effort disap-
pears from the policy agenda. Global increases in
calorie availability are very low compared with GO
and TG.
Food system outcomes are worst under the Order
from Strength (OS) scenario, which combines a react-
ive approach to ecosystem stresses with high trade
barriers and low levels of global cooperation. Per
capita food availability in 2050 reaches only around
80 per cent of GO levels. OS is the only MA scenario
with rising child malnutrition. Owing to insufﬁcient
investment in yield improvements, production
growth necessitates signiﬁcant crop area expansion
in both developed and developing regions. The out-
look for sub-Saharan Africa is particularly
concerning: OS envisages a signiﬁcant decline in
farm output exacerbated by climate change impacts,
and widespread food insecurity as a trigger of mass
migration from southern to West and East Africa,
leading to social unrest and civil war in the
latter regions.
(c) Normative scenarios
(i) Comprehensive assessment scenario
The CAWMA also developed a preferred future of
optimistic investment approaches to meet the target
of feeding a global population of 9 million in 2050
(de Fraiture et al. 2007). In scenario analysis preferred
futures are often referred to as a ‘ﬁfth scenario’.
The ﬁndings from the ﬁve scenarios developed pre-
viously (rainfed optimistic, rainfed pessimistic,
irrigation expansion, irrigation yield improvement,
trade) strongly favour a portfolio approach to
investment that is customized for each region. In
South Asia, the emphasis is on irrigation yield
improvement, with limitations placed on new irriga-
tion development so that there is a focus on poverty
reduction of smallholders and groundwater resources
are protected. On the other hand, in sub-Saharan
Africa, the emphasis is on improving the performance
of rainfed agriculture. Smallholders concentrate on
producing labour-intensive crops for local markets.
Physical and institutional infrastructure enables rural
growth and poverty reduction, and eventually with
urbanization and diversiﬁcation, farm sizes and
incomes increase. There is also an increase in the irri-
gated area by around 80 per cent to support
production of high-value cash crops such as sugar,
cotton and fruit. For the Middle East and North
Africa freshwater withdrawals are subject to increased
regulation and there is a switch from irrigated cereal
crops to higher value fruit and vegetables. East Asia
improves existing irrigation productivity and with the
integration of ﬁsheries in paddy production, aquacul-
ture production increases. China, in particular,
regulates environmental ﬂows more carefully and
becomes a major grain importer. There is an expan-
sion of cultivated areas in Eastern Europe, Central
Asia and Latin America, mostly for rainfed pro-
duction. Latin America increases exports of sugar,
soya beans and biofuels. In OECD countries aquatic
ecosystem services are restored and agricultural
exports fall with subsidy reform. The global average
rainfed cereal yield increases by 58 per cent and
rainfed water productivity improves by 31 per cent.
For irrigated yields the increase is 55 per cent and
water productivity improves by 38 per cent. Globally,
harvested areas increase by 14 per cent, although
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comes from cropping intensity rather than from
expansion. Negative impacts on terrestrial ecosystems
are mitigated by regulation. Freshwater withdrawals
by agriculture increase by only 13 per cent in 2050
in this normative, preserving future.
(ii) Agrimonde 1
The Agrimonde project, jointly initiated by the Institut
National de la Recherche Agronomique and the
Centre de Coope ´ration Internationale en Recherche
Agronomique, created a mostly qualitative scenario
of a sustainable food system that feeds a global popu-
lation of 9 billion people in 2050. It uses a basic
quantitative tool called Agribiom to simulate regional
supplies, uses and balances of physical food biomasses
and their calorie equivalents but does not attempt to
determine market prices for agricultural commodities
(Chaumet et al. 2009). This future, entitled Agri-
monde 1, was inspired by a book that proposed a
sustainability scenario for the food system driven by
a ‘doubly green revolution’ (Griffon 2006). The nor-
mative target is, thus, that in 2050 the world has
developed a sustainable food system. In fact, it is
assumed provocatively that in each region there is an
equalization of consumption to an average of
3000 kcal per person per day in 2050.
In the late 2010s, increasing instances of food crises
threaten social and political stability. Values converge
among actors and the concept of a sustainable
food system is pursued following ‘hunger riots’.
A globalized community of practice evolves to
manage ecosystem services and there are limits on pro-
prietary intellectual property. Climate change has
driven technological development in agriculture
towards an ecological intensiﬁcation that is sufﬁciently
productive yet minimizes environmental externalities
for soil, water and biodiversity. Greater biodiversity is
assumed to improve system resilience. Such paradigms
for sustainable agriculture have been advocated for
developing countries (Pretty et al. 2006). An energy
crisis in the 2020s provokes a step-change in the
energy system towards decentralization of production.
By 2050, there is global governance to prevent distort-
ing policies and to intervene in the management of
reserve stocks in order to protect import-dependent
countries. Markets are regulated to prevent price vola-
tility. There are also national and regional strategies
integrated at different layers of power devoted to
food security. Greater investments in infrastructure
and social services have been partly made possible by
improved income from rural areas. The industrial agri-
cultural model, though initially dominant, merges with
more local food and agricultural systems, especially in
developing countries. There is a lower proportion of
processed to raw products; and regulations impose
greater accountability on companies to support
nutritional objectives.
In OECD countries, reductions in kilocalorie per
capita consumption are driven by less waste, better
nutrition policy and behaviour change; in sub-Saharan
Africa, increases are driven by sustainable economic
development. Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa
successfully exploit supply-side yield gaps where
agro-ecological capability and capacity are available.
Countries in the former Soviet Union also exploit
yield gaps but on land with less potential. Yield gaps
between the least productive and the most productive
have narrowed. A new generation of biofuels has also
emerged by 2050. The world’s total crop area (food
and non-food) is extended by 39 per cent to 2050
with new croplands mainly in Latin America and
sub-Saharan Africa. Pasture is the land cover mostly
converted because of pressures to conserve forests.
The irrigated area is static in all regions except sub-
Saharan Africa where it has doubled, and in Asia
where there has been a slight increase. Three regions
have aggregate import dependencies; Asia has to
import calories for animal feed; and it is necessary
for the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan
Africa to import to satisfy food demand. Three regions
have surpluses—OECD countries, Latin America and
the former Soviet Union.
(d) Discussion of case studies
The challenge of communicating multiple futures of
complex systems has led to a preference towards scen-
ario axes of two relatively independent, high impact,
highly uncertain dimensions of uncertainty (Alcamo
2001)( ﬁgure 5). Rigorous and transparent manage-
ment of uncertainty is necessary to judge the
adequacy of any model to be a proxy to the future
system (Wack 1985a; Rotmans & van Asselt 2001).
Nevertheless, quantitative food system models are
valuable in managing existing knowledge on system
behaviour and ensuring the credibility of qualitative
stories.
Wack (1985a) argues that the most important part of
the scenario analysis process is to challenge the mental
maps that actors use to navigate the future of the system
of interest. Projections based solely on a model of the
existing system may help to point towards sensitivities
in the system and highlight new policy areas worthy of
present attention but they are less suitable to manage
uncertainty over long-term horizons. Indeed, the FAO
baseline projection acknowledges the need for greater
analysis of the impact of rising energy prices on food
system structure. The CAWMA is an interesting
example of the potential of multiple scenarios to sim-
plify policy challenges rather than complicate them
(Schoemaker 1993). Its ﬁve scenarios point compel-
lingly to a normative preferred future for the food
system. Regardless of this ‘ﬁfth scenario’ these strategies
can only ameliorate the increase in freshwater withdra-
wals that will be required to feed the global population
in 2050. Variation in regional agro-ecological capability
and capacity, and diversity in agricultural systems,
suggest that a strategic portfolio of policy responses
will be necessary. Input assumptions for highly signiﬁ-
cant socio-economic drivers of change such as GDP
growth are held constant across the scenarios to test
the sensitivity of the system to alternative investment
strategies; and although this may have been suitable
for the purpose of the exercise in question, this
method would not have been appropriate for
exploratory scenario analysis.
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(2004), even if food security outcomes in the A2 scen-
ario include an estimated increase in the number of
people at risk of hunger to 600 million by 2080. The
limitations of the analysis are transparently acknow-
ledged and highlight areas where innovation is
necessary in biophysical modelling. For example,
crop yield change estimates assume pests and diseases
are controlled; ﬂooding is not simulated in the crop
models; assumptions of farm-level adaptation are
based on current technology; and hydrological pro-
cesses are simpliﬁed because of the resolution of the
climate simulations. The effect of CO2 fertilization
on yields is an important ‘known unknown’. It
should also be noted that where once the A2 scenario
was considered to be an extreme future, it has increas-
ingly begun to be viewed as ‘business as usual’ (Nelson
et al. 2009).
Exploratoryscenariosmaybethemostsuitablescen-
ario type for managing uncertainty in the food system
over long-term horizons to 2050 but the development
of such scenarios requires signiﬁcantly more resources
than projections (Willenbockel 2009). Interestingly,
exploratory scenarios from previous exercises that
include analysis of food system are homogeneous and
group into scenario families with similar food security
outcomes. Cumming et al. (2005) propose ﬁve scenario
families for integrated environmental assessments. In
‘market forces’, economic growth is the overriding
aim of the system and as a consequence there are nega-
tive environmental externalities; values are broadly
individualistic. The ‘reformedmarket’useshierarchical
governance to address such externalities with regu-
lation at the expense of some economic growth. A
disconnected world of ‘higher fences’ may be the
result of de-globalization if protectionism rises and
trade volume falls in response to anxiety and fatalism
about the future. The ‘values change’ family of scen-
arios is characterized by convergence towards a more
sustainable and egalitarian society. Lastly, regionaliza-
tion and localism may produce a ‘multipolar world’.
For three recent integrated assessments that provide
a reasonable ﬁt to these families, food security out-
comes are similar (Parry et al. 2004; Carpenter et al.
2005; UNEP 2007). Global aggregate food availability
and accessibility outcomes are broadly similar in the
‘market forces’ and ‘reformed market’ scenario family
with signiﬁcant reductions in malnourishment; at a
regional scale sub-Saharan Africa and Asia remain the
regions at most risk of hunger. However, food security
outcomes may worsen beyond 2050 in ‘market forces’
as negative environmental externalities accumulate.
The ‘values change’scenario produces the most positive
food security outcomes at global and regional scales
because this is a more equitable future, with positive
economic convergence between regions, and livelihoods
that are increasingly sustained by nature’s income rather
than from erosion of its capital. The ‘higher fences’
scenario family produces noticeably negative outcomes
at global and regional scales as a consequence of protec-
tionist trade, which limits food availability, and low
economic growth, which reduces food accessibility.
Negative environmental externalities are especially
severe as agro-ecological capabilities are stretched
beyond appropriate limits. The full implications of cli-
mate change for the food system are not yet examined
in these case studies because of technical, methodologi-
cal and epistemological uncertainties. Nevertheless, it is
expected to challenge the adaptive capacity of agricul-
ture production in the developing world by 2050
(Parry et al.2 0 0 4 ; Nelson et al.2 0 0 9 ). If climate
change widens the difference in yields between devel-
oped and developing countries in the future, such a
divergence in outcomes may be exacerbated by existing
yield gaps in the present. If fences are erected—politi-
cally, economically or technologically—food security
outcomes for vulnerable regions in this future are very
worrying.
Agrimonde 1 provides the narrative of a pathway
towards feeding the global population healthily and
sustainably, but it is not able to underpin its analysis
with a credible quantitative simulation of the food
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Figure 5. Axes of the MA scenarios. Source: Carpenter et al. (2005). Source: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005
Ecosystems and human well-being: scenarios. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, DC.
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use model simulation outputs. Food system models
simulate the future based on the past, and if the food
system is expected to profoundly transform, as it
does in this scenario, a quantitative proxy for the exist-
ing system is less valid. It is a scenario that deliberately
challenges the mental maps of food system actors, not
least in its assumption of an equalization in food
demand and in its expectation of extensiﬁcation.
According to the internal logic of the scenario, a
world with a sustainable food system is still vulnerable
to negative food security outcomes. Moreover, the
‘values change’ scenario family, the step-changes
required to produce a paradigm shift to a sustainable
food system in 2050 are non-trivial. Multiple scenarios
are, therefore, recommended for food system actors to
prepare for the future with strategies that adequately
hedge against uncertainty (Lempert et al. 2006).
Finally, if there is one conclusion that can be drawn
across this diverse selection of case studies, it is that
international trade will be a crucial determinant of
food system outcomes, both for food security and
sustainability. Yet, both the general and partial
equilibrium modelling approaches have a tendency to
smooth outcomes, based on a sequence of equilibria,
which means that potential trade shocks and resulting
discontinuities in the food system are difﬁcult to
simulate.
5. CHALLENGES FOR FOOD SYSTEM SCENARIO
ANALYSIS AND MODELLING
(a) Challenges for scenario analysis
Scenarios are not predictions; and scenario analysis is
arguably at its most powerful as a vehicle for experien-
tial learning (Wack 1985a). Alcamo (2001) suggests
that integrated environmental assessments employing
qualitative scenarios analysis and quantitative model-
ling may inﬂuence policy-makers by managing
knowledge in a way that is more communicable. Yet,
there is a paucity of research on the impact of such
assessments on system actors. An evaluation of the
MA found ‘little evidence so far that the MA has
had a signiﬁcant direct impact on policy formulation
and decision-making, especially in developing
countries’ (Wells et al. 2006, p. 38). For environmental
assessments more generally, Mitchell et al. (2006,
p. 324) ﬁnd that the nature of the process of know-
ledge co-production among stakeholders is a stronger
determinant of inﬂuence than ﬁnal outputs. For scen-
ario analysis in particular, stakeholder participation is
crucial (van der Heijden 2005, p. 220). Knowledge
co-production may be impeded if scenario analysis is
not sufﬁciently participatory or if the modelling
process used to underpin narratives is not accessible.
Garb et al. (2008) highlight a social divide between
scenario developers and users that results in a ‘clumsy
hand-off’ of learning. Drivers of change affect the food
system at global, regional, national and local scales
(Hazell & Wood 2008). Food system actors also inter-
act with the system at different scales and in a variety
of ways. Although scenario analysis is necessary at
the global scale, participatory processes with key stake-
holders at other geographical scales may increase the
quality of scenario analysis and improve its impact
(Zurek & Henrichs 2007). Alternatively, in circum-
stances where this is not feasible, improving the
transparency of the scenario and modelling process
may be a pragmatic compromise to encourage engage-
ment with other food system actors (Parson 2008;
table 2). The process for developing a new generation
of normative climate scenarios builds on some of these
principles and may offer a useful way forward (Moss
et al. 2010).
Wack (1985a,b) evaluates the impact of scenario
analysis based on its ability to provoke decision-
makers to reconsider and ultimately redraw the
mental maps with which they navigate the future of a
system. Schoemaker (1993), in an exploration of the
psychological beneﬁts of scenario analysis, concludes
that scenario analysis can indeed expand thinking;
but more empirical research is required into the ways
in which scenarios can successfully alter the mental
maps actors have of a system (Garb et al. 2008).
Thompson & Scoones (2009) challenge the world-
views with which the food system is envisaged. Basic
narratives of growth, it is argued, have been over-
emphasized, at the expense of more multi-dimensional
narratives of adaptation. For long-term objectives of
reducing poverty in the rural developing world and
maintaining ecosystem services, alternative narratives
of sustainable agriculture and participatory research
and development are proposed. With notable excep-
tions such as the MA, the concept of sustainability
across the social, economic, biophysical, political and
institutional dimensions of the food system has been
inadequately explored so far in integrated assessments,
mostly for reasons of technical, methodological and
epistemological uncertainty (Swart et al. 2004). Scen-
ario analysis could be increasingly important in
developing new worldviews of a food system that can
feed a growing population healthily and sustainably
in 2050.
(b) Knowledge gaps and priorities for modelling
research
It is widely acknowledged that more work on the valid-
ation of model components used in integrated
assessment studies is required, yet existing data sources
often do not provide a sufﬁcient basis for an ex-post
comparison of simulation results with historical obser-
vations. On the other hand, in the presence of climate
change and potential nonlinearities and tipping points,
there is a risk of over-calibrating models to past pro-
cesses that might not necessarily be the processes
driving future developments (Uthes et al.i np r e s s ).
For modellers involved in integrated assessment,
the availability, coverage, quality and accessibility of
spatially explicit datasets for global crop production
and trade, land use and hydrology are major concerns.
In addition to primary data collection efforts, the
development of an integrated data repository along
with concordances between datasets that are based
on different conceptual schemes and scales would be
desirable. There is a need for scaling algorithms that
ensure conceptual consistency of the data ﬂow
between model components that operate at different
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downscaling methods exist but knowledge about scal-
ing in integrated assessment is still in a state of infancy
and often lacks scientiﬁc rigour (Ewert et al. 2009).
The EU SEAMLESS project may be seen as a
promising initial effort in this direction.
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report identiﬁes a
long list of knowledge gaps and associated research
priorities related to climate change impacts on agricul-
tural production (Easterling et al. 2007), which
includes inter alia the need for (i) further free air
CO2 enrichment (FACE) experiments on an expanded
range of crops, pastures, forests and locations,
especially crops of importance for the rural poor in
developing countries; (ii) basic knowledge of pest, dis-
ease and weed response to elevated CO2 and climate
change; (iii) a better representation of climate variabil-
ity including extreme events at different temporal
scales in crop models; (iv) new global simulation
studies that incorporate new crop, forestry and live-
stock knowledge in models; (v) more research to
identify highly vulnerable microenvironments and to
provide economic coping strategies for the affected
populations, since relatively moderate impacts of
climate change on overall agro-ecological conditions
are likely to mask much more severe climatic and
economic vulnerability at the local level; and
(vi) examination of a wider range of adaptation strat-
egies and adaptation costs in modelling frameworks.
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